Saudi Arabia & US Foreign policy

[practical_radical]

Something I wrote for a class, and the mother-of-all pbpp boosters :p
Thoughts?
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International forces shaped the history of Saudi Arabia. The current state owes its existence to alliances made with Great Britain, and the discovery of oil in the 1930s brought even greater international influence to the Saudi Arabia. Today, Saudi Arabia is an archetype for authoritarian repression and limited political participation, and has become increasingly so in recent years. Some blame the ultra-conservative Wahhabiyya sect of Islam that is the state religion in Saudi Arabia for lack liberalism and democratic reform. Others claim the kingdom’s oil economy fosters repression. These domestic forces may be some of the immediate causes of the lack of democracy and freedom in Saudi Arabia, but their anti-democratic effects are largely the product of international forces, exerted primarily by the United States. The status of Saudi Arabia as a “rentier state,” or a state that derives the majority of its revenue from foreign sources, may create anti-democratic effects, especially in petrol-based economies where the revenues can be huge and the government has enormous wealth with which it can repress the citizenry and “buy off” opposition groups. The domestic effects of the rentier state, however, cannot exist without supportive economic policies on the part of client states, namely the U.S. The rhetoric of American foreign policy been generally pro-democratic, especially concerning Iraq and the Muslim world. So why, then, has a state where the U.S. has been so intimately involved over the last century remained so vehemently anti-democratic? What has the United States done to exert political pressure on the Saudi government to affect reform? Can these pressures change internal Saudi politics in the face of international forces that may, intentionally or unintentionally, be strengthening the dictatorial Saudi regime? And, most importantly, should the United States push harder for democratic reform in Saudi Arabia? In “International Causes of Democratization,” Drake identifies international forces active in democratizing several Latin American states, one of the most important being “external forces fomenting disorder. ” In Saudi Arabia, American economic policy may be an international force acting to prevent disorder that might lead to liberalization and democratization.
As is commonly accepted, the human rights record of the Saudi government is abysmal. The Amnesty International 2004 Report describes the government as perpetrating “gross human rights violations,” including torture of political prisoners, mistreatment of Iraqi refugees, over 100 executions in the past year and official toleration of the abuse of women. How can the United States, which used human rights violations as a justification for military intervention in Iraq, declare an “eternal friendship” (from a conversation between President George W. Bush and Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah) with a state so widely acknowledged as being a systematic violator of human rights and democratic reform?
In an effort to apply pressure to repressive regimes, the U.S. State Department began releasing Country Reports on Human Rights Practices as advisory documents for Congress in developing pro-human rights foreign policies. In 2003, the wording does not compare in severity to the Amnesty International report, only going so far as calling the situation “poor. ” The indictments of states like Iran and Libya are far more scathing.
Drake claims that U.S. pressure under the Carter administration for greater protection of human rights “undermined the legitimacy of dictators. While this may have been the case in Latin America, Saudi Arabia remained unchanged. The final year of Carter’s administration saw 63 public executions, more than the subsequent eight years. In fact, Carter said of the Saudis: “There has not been any nation in the world that has been more cooperative than Saudi Arabia. ” Why would Saudi Arabia be such an extreme exception? The Carter administration saw a severe oil shortage due to an OPEC embargo, and due to America’s reliance on foreign oil, and the fact that Saudi Arabia has the largest proven oil reserves in the world, he could not afford to pull for reform in a state that had the power to bring America to its knees economically.
The potential for democratic and liberal reform resulting from international pressure was realized on a limited scale in 1962. Under pressure from the Kennedy administration to implement reform, King Faisal of Saudi Arabia announced a ten-point reform plan. While only one reform was ever instituted – the abolition of slavery – it was an important step forward. This action resulted from international pressure in the form of the 1956 U.N. Supplementary Convention on Slavery, which was directed at Saudi Arabia, which, at the time, had a slave population numbering over 30,000.
The larger reform plan included a modernization of bureaucracy and administration, legal reform, and, most importantly, the reestablishment of the “Majlis al-Shura,” or consultative council and the formation of provincial councils. As the Cold War intensified, however, the United States was willing to ease pressure to democratize to keep Saudi Arabia as an ally against communism. Unfortunately, the reforms never went so far as actually giving authority to the regional councils or appointing a new Majlis al-Shura under Faisal’s reign.

Drake describes American foreign policy in Latin America between 1946 and 1956 as being extremely anti-communist:
“The United States changed its relations with the rest of the hemisphere to align with almost any type of government – in many cases authoritarian regimes – willing to combat the ‘Red Menace.’”
This was certainly the case in the relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia. The Saudi Royal Family was almost radically anti-communist, seeing it as a threat both to Islam and their enormous wealth. The perceived communist threat in the Middle East was Egypt, in particular its military dictator, Gemal Nasser. Nasser was not actually a communist, but a nationalist. His regime, however, was allied with the Soviets, primarily as a reaction to American support of the Saudis. Nasser and the Free Officers sought regional hegemony just as the Saudis did, and saw monetary and military support from the Soviets as a way to counteract economic and military support given to the Saudis by the United States.
During the height of Arab Nationalism and Ba’ath Party movements across the Middle East, a degree of dissent became visible in Saudi Arabia. One of the primary threats perceived by the Saudi Royal Family was that the Nasserist, Ba’athist, communist and even religious movements would seek to lessen or eliminate western, and specifically American, influence in Saudi Arabia. Given the economic and military support the U.S. provided to the Saudis, such a reversal in foreign policy was a threat to their power.
The Saudis took the initiative given to them by the U.S. to repress all forms of dissent under the blanket of anti-communism. The Saudis clamped down on communism, liberalism, Arab Nationalism, labor unions, Shiite minority rights and women’s rights.
The first major labor movement in Saudi Arabia began with the workers of ARAMCO – the Arabian-American Oil Company – in 1953 and 1956. At this time, and until the 80s, ARAMCO was only part owned by the Saudi government, and the major controlling interest was Standard Oil of California, an American company. Since American interests were involved, the three-day strike in 1956 was suppressed. Two hundred workers were arrested, and three were beaten to death publicly by order of the Saudi government. The strike began over transportation concerns, but once the strikers began to air grievances with the government, they were brutally suppressed. ARAMCO’s private security forces also aided Saudi Arabia in resisting the tide of republicanism from South Yemen that it saw as a threat to the monarchy.
The height of Saudi opposition was in the 1960s and 1970s, sparked by the ARAMCO strikes. The various groups existed under the banner of communist and socialist labor parties. In reality, these groups were looking for basic democratic and human rights reforms, not communist revolution and alignment with the Soviet Union. The Socialist Labor Party in the Arabian Peninsula, one of the larger groups in the Saudi opposition, described the movement’s goals as threefold: “political liberalization, a real nationalization of oil and the liquidation of the foreign military presence in our country” None of the communist rhetoric of China or the USSR was really present in the writings of the Saudi communist groups, who acted mainly as offshoots of the Arab Nationalist Movement. These names of these groups did, however, contain trigger phrases that brought American anti-communist foreign policy to bear on the region. In 1957, a meeting between King Saud and President Eisenhower cemented an anti-communist alliance between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, which included $180 million in aid from the U.S. (when Saudi Arabia was still a recipient of U.S. aid). In his memoirs, Eisenhower detailed the logic in propping up the corrupt and repressive Saudi regime, and his plan to “…[build] up King Saud as a counterweight to Nasser,” because he “…at least professed anti-communism.”
This type of foreign policy is echoed in many ways today. The war on terror has given the Saudi government another opportunity to crush opposition forces of all types in the name of fighting terrorism. Critics of the state are now arrested and detained in the context of combating terrorism.
Beyond political considerations, the America’s greatest influence in Saudi Arabia is economic. As a major purchaser of Saudi oil, U.S. energy policy has a direct effect on the Saudi economy. With the movement to nationalize the oil industry crushed by U.S.-supported anti-communist policies, the huge flow of “petrol dollars” coming into Saudi Arabia would fill the coffers of the royal family. This economic situation has had many severe anti-democratic effects. With their enormous wealth, Saudi Arabia has been able to buy and fund many major news outlets in the Arab world, guaranteeing a favorable portrayal in many “mouthpiece” publications across the Middle East. Perhaps most damaging to democratic reform has been the Saudi government’s ability to “buy off” opposition forces.
One of the groups with the greatest potential for coherent opposition is Saudi Arabia’s sizeable Shiite minority, which has not only been persecuted on religious terms, but also makes up a portion of the oil-extraction labor force, which was stripped of almost all rights after the ARAMCO strikes. During the 1980s, like many other groups, the primary Shiite opposition force, which was forced to operate outside of Saudi Arabia was paid off by the government and allowed to return. While it appears that these are internal operations of the Saudi state, they would be impossible without U.S. money.
In recent years, one of the most influential policy decisions by the U.S. was the stationing of American troops on Saudi soil for the liberation of Kuwait during the 1991 Gulf War. The Saudis, unwilling to risk the lucrative relationship they had maintained with America for so many years, allowed the troop presence, despite widespread protest both inside and outside the kingdom. This decision ended up fostering the rise of a new opposition whose beginnings were concealed within the Saudi radical Wahhabi framework. Radical Islamists, specifically al-Qa’ida, seized the opportunity to gain support within the kingdom. September awakened many U.S. policy makers to the need to change their strategies in regards to Saudi Arabia. The channels of dissent had to be opened to allow a progressive side to the opposition to the Saudi government.
Late in 2002, the United States announced the U.S.-Middle East Partnership Initiative. The initiative encompassed $1 billion dollars annually to “expand economic, political and educational opportunities for all” in Arab states. Three sectors in which funds are to be allotted are education, economic reform and private sector development and strengthening civil society. Saudi Arabia is mentioned under the education category, specifically training NGOs to “share knowledge with all levels of society,” but no specific states are mentioned under the other two categories. In practice, allotted monies have gone to Saudi groups to establish engineering programs for women. The target of the initial $18.5 million was primarily academic institutions in Algeria, Tunisia, the Palestinian Territories, Jordan and Morocco, to fund programs in American Studies, and significantly, journalism. This was not the case with funds going to Saudi Arabia. While an engineering curriculum for women is a positive step toward expanding opportunities for Saudi women, funds for journalism, perhaps leading to the establishment of an independent press with the ability to question the actions of the Saudi government, would have been a true effort toward encouraging democratic reform in Saudi Arabia.
A surprisingly powerful step was taken in the direction of pressing the Saudis to liberalize when the State Department in 2004 named Saudi Arabia a “Country of Particular Concern” regarding religious freedom. If taken to its full extent, this classification could even lead to potential sanctions against Saudi Arabia. Government officials acknowledged the “close ties” between America and the Saudis, and that a greater degree of cooperation would be needed to change the situation. The classification did finally acknowledge some of the hypocritical policies of the Saudi government regarding religious pluralism, including declaring the legality of non-Muslim worship as long as it takes place inside the home, when in reality, people were arrested and deported for that exact practice.
The future of democratic reform in Saudi Arabia – and America’s role in that reform – is uncertain. Two opposing forces are working within the kingdom: one being America’s war on terror, which is giving the agents of repression in Saudi Arabia an excuse to repress any and all descent, as in the Cold War era; the other is a realization by American policy makers that the channels of descent need to be opened, so that progressives, and not just religious extremist groups like al-Qa’ida, will have a say in the reforming of the Saudi political system. The kingdom is preparing for its first real attempt at democratic elections in almost 40 years, scheduled for next year. These municipal elections will only effect local politics, but many see it as a vital step forward in the democratization of one of the world’s most authoritarian governments. Optimism should be guarded, at best. Elections were originally planned for 2004, and have already been delayed once. There wass some hope for reform in the Saudi judicial system until, in March, where a group of dissidents were put on trial for “advocating democracy.” Some hope remained after the trial began, as the proceedings were kept open, making it the first public trial in the country’s history. But the proceedings were soon closed without reason. Most importantly, however, is that women will not be allowed to vote in the coming elections. Even after years under the brutally repressive Taliban regime, today, after U.S. military intervention and fostering of democratic institutions, women turned out to the polls in huge numbers. Saudi officials claim that there are not enough women to work at the planned gender-segregated polls. Early in the process, soon after the elections were announced, several women announced candidacy for elected office. Unfortunately, the government immediately suppressed such efforts until “studies” proved the usefulness of women in electoral politics. Secretary of State Colin Powell responded to the restrictions by saying “these things have to come in due course.” Why, when women can vote in Afghanistan, must those same rights in Saudi Arabia, a U.S. ally, come “in due course”? It is clear that these reforms must go much further to be considered a valid step toward democratization.
The history of Saudi Arabia clearly shows the power that American influence has over its internal politics. The U.S. consistently supports reform and democratization in its rhetoric, but it needs to acknowledge that its foreign and economic polices are reinforcing authoritarianism and illiberalism in the kingdom. Since America molded the Saudi state into what it is today, it has a huge degree of responsibility in guiding it toward democracy and reform. The U.S. must stop tolerating the violation of human rights and the right of the Saudi people to change their government in the name of 28002800protecting economic interests. The U.S. has to hold Saudi Arabia to the same standard to which it holds the rest of the world’s autocratic and dictatorial regimes, rather than turning a blind eye to repression. The Middle East Partnership Initiative is a true step in the right direction, but it is a measure that must be given “teeth” in order to be effective. More money needs to be allocated, and targeted directly at Saudi Arabia by funding alternative sources of information and cultivating civil society. America must also help diversify the Saudi economy by encouraging (and subsidizing, if need be) a manufacturing sector to help limit the anti-democratic effects of the rentier state. Most importantly, U.S. policy makers must change the tone of their rhetoric towards Saudi Arabia. Rather than either toning-down criticism of the Saudi regime, or white-washing their authoritarianism and human-rights violations in State Department reports, America must go before the international community and openly condemn the repression in Saudi Arabia, rather than condoning it through inaction. The United States should not consider Saudi Arabia an “eternal friend” until democratic reform has been instituted.

[RAJ]

Isn't this against rules?

[Charlotte]

not sure, how many VSP did ya get for that?

[practical_radical]